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Abstract
The catastrophic ﬁre at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017 killed
72 people and shocked the world. It also changed many
more lives forever. As well as the police and public inquiries,
which are ongoing, it led to an independent review of
Building Regulations and Fire Safety, led by Dame Judith
Hackitt, a Chartered Engineer and Fellow of the Royal
Academy of Engineering.
Her review, and the associated activity around building
regulations in England, is the most signiﬁcant review in over
a generation, since the 1984 Building Act, and is widely
recognised as being a once in two generations opportunity
to reform building regulations in England. It will also have
implications in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, which
are watching closely. Moreover, it will extend beyond
building regulations, which apply up until a building is
complete and handed over, into the operation of the
building and subsequent maintenance and minor works.
This review activity is being watched closely outside the UK
too, with three states in the Australian Commonwealth
introducing legislation related to cladding on tall buildings
in October 2018.
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This paper summarises the activity associated with the review, and
also considers where we are likely to see changes in practice as
a result of Grenfell Tower. Many have said that the industry must
change in order that we reduce, as far as is humanly possible, the
prospect of any such ﬁre occurring again.
Dame Judith was asked to focus on “High Rise Residential Buildings”
(HRRBs), with a twofold purpose:
• To make recommendations that will ensure we have a sufﬁciently
robust regulatory system for the future;
• To provide further assurance to residents that the complete system
is working to ensure the buildings they live in are safe and will
remain so.
Dame Judith was asked to:
• Map the current regulatory system (i.e. the regulations, guidance
and processes) as it applies to new and existing buildings through
planning, design, construction, maintenance, refurbishment and
change management;
• Consider the competencies, duties and balance of responsibilities
of key individuals within the system in ensuring that ﬁre safety
standards are adhered to;
• Assess the theoretical coherence of the current regulatory system
and how it operates in practice;
• Compare this with other international regulatory systems for buildings and regulatory systems in other sectors with similar safety
risks;
• Make recommendations that ensure the regulatory system is ﬁt
for purpose with a particular focus on multi-occupancy high-rise
residential buildings.
The review began by calling for evidence from interested parties.
As well as contributing to responses by the Construction Industry
Council and Royal Academy of Engineering, CIBSE responded with a
detailed contribution on façade engineering aspects of the review
developed by a working group of the Society of Façade Engineers1.
Dame Judith’s interim report was published on 18 December 20172,
in which she concluded that the current system of regulation of
HRRBs is not ﬁt for purpose.
Dame Judith commented on some of her observations during the
initial phase of the review, saying: “I have been shocked by some of
the practices I have heard about and I am convinced of the need for
a new intelligent system of regulation and enforcement for high-rise
and complex buildings that will encourage everyone to do the right
thing, and will hold to account those who try to cut corners.
“Changes to the regulatory regime will help, but on their own will
not be sufﬁcient unless we can change the culture away from one of
doing the minimum required for compliance, to one of taking
ownership and responsibility for delivering a safe system throughout
the life-cycle of a building.”
She gave extended evidence later that day to the Communities and
Local Government Select Committee of parliament3. This underlined
her concerns and set out a number of reasons for them:
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1) Current regulations and guidance are too complex and unclear.
This can lead to confusion and misinterpretation in their application
to high-rise and complex buildings;
2) Clarity of roles and responsibilities is poor. Even where there
are requirements for key activities to take place across design,
construction and maintenance, it is not always clear who has
responsibility for making it happen;
3) Despite many who demonstrate good practice, the means of
assessing and ensuring the competency of key people throughout
the system is inadequate. There is often no differentiation in competency requirements for those working on high-rise and complex
buildings;
4) Compliance, enforcement and sanctions processes are too weak.
What is being designed is not what is being built and there is a lack
of robust change control. The lack of meaningful sanctions does not
drive the right behaviours;
5) The route for residents to escalate concerns is unclear and
inadequate;
6) The system of product testing, marketing and quality assurance is
not clear.
In late January there was an industry summit, which was accompanied
by a statement which reinforced the interim ﬁndings and set out the
next steps:
• The current system for ensuring ﬁre safety in high-rise and
complex buildings is not ﬁt for purpose;
• A culture change is required, with industry taking greater
responsibility for what is built – this change needs to start now;
• This applies throughout the building life-cycle, both during construction and occupation;
• A clear, quick and effective route for residents to raise concerns,
and be listened to, must be created.
The Report set out six broad areas for change:
• Ensuring that regulation and guidance is risk-based, proportionate
and unambiguous;
• Clarifying roles and responsibilities for ensuring that buildings are
safe;
• Improving levels of competence within the industry;
• Improving the process, compliance and enforcement of regulations;
• Creating a clear, quick and effective route for residents’ voices to
be heard and listened to;
• Improving testing, marketing and quality assurance of products
used in construction.
The second and ﬁnal phase of the Review set out to develop practical
solutions that will deliver these areas of change and support the
direction of travel set out in the Interim Report. Nothing short of a
major overhaul of the whole system was envisaged, and Dame Judith
undertook to work with all those who shared her ambition and drive

to create a new and robust regulatory framework and system that
supports this. Across all sectors of the industry she called for radical
thinking about the immediate actions that could be taken to lead to
sustainable change.
Industry leaders at the summit committed to work to create a new
system that will work effectively and coherently, with working groups
formed to develop innovative solutions in the following key areas:
Design, construction and refurbishment: Establishing what industry and regulators need to do to fully embed building safety
during the design and construction phase;
Occupation and maintenance: Identifying what building owners,
landlords and regulators need to do differently to ensure that building
safety is prioritised when a building is occupied and throughout its
life-cycle;
Products: Determining how the product testing and marketing regime can be improved;
Competency: Establishing how competency requirements for key
individuals involved in building and managing complex and high-risk
buildings should change;
Residents’ voice: Determining the best way for residents to be given
a clear, quick and effective statutory route for raising concerns on ﬁre
safety;
Regulation and guidance: Resolving whether central Government
ownership of technical guidance is the most appropriate model for
complex and high-risk buildings.
An expert group was also formed by the Ministry of Housing,
Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) to inform the
government response to the recommendation to consider how the
suite of Approved Documents could be structured and ordered to
provide a more streamlined, holistic view, while keeping the right
level of relevant technical detail. The author chaired this working
group. Its recommendations were submitted in March to Dame
Judith and accepted in full in her ﬁnal report. In response to Grenfell,
MHCLG also established a very comprehensive web-based compendium of Grenfell-related information4.
Dame Judith’s ﬁnal report was published by government on 18 May
20185. In response to her remit, to “make recommendations that
ensure that the regulatory system is ﬁt for purpose with a particular
focus on multi-occupancy high-rise residential buildings”, the report
focuses on “higher risk residential buildings”, deﬁned as residential
buildings over 10 storeys. However, Dame Judith notes that a number
of her recommendations should extend to multi-occupancy buildings.
This has prompted considerable debate, and current thinking within
the Construction Industry Council (CIC), which brings together all
the professional bodies in the industry in England, is that her
recommendations should apply to all multiple-occupancy residential
buildings, regardless of height.
The report envisages a new regulatory system, bringing the Fire
Service, Health and Safety Executive and Building Control services
together in a “Joint Competent Authority” (JCA), which is proposed
to oversee both construction and operation of higher-risk buildings,
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and to take responsibility for the enforcement of the Building
Regulations and other relevant legislation relating to HRRBs (see
Chapter 1). It calls for a series of Gateways for new HRRBs and major
projects on existing HRRBs, which would entail signiﬁcant scrutiny
and sign-off by the JCA. It also envisages a role for the JCA in
overseeing a safety case system for existing HRRBs through the whole
operating life of the building (see Chapters 2 & 3).
The report calls for radical change in the current Building Regulations
and associated guidance (Chapter 6), and for provision of full digital
models for all new higher-risk buildings, and for them to be
maintained through the life of the building (Chapter 8).
However, it is Chapter 5 that sets out the (potentially) most farreaching recommendations for CIBSE and its members, and indeed
for all professionals, relating to competence. Recommendation 5.2 of
the Review calls for the professions to come together to provide a
new and more robust and effective system for recognising and
maintaining competence. The terms used in the Report could not set
a clearer challenge to the built environment professions, and merits
reading in full.
Dame Judith, a past-President of the Institution of Chemical Engineers,
was clear that professional bodies in the built environment and
property and ﬁre safety sectors must ﬁnd a way to work together.
She calls on government to supervise the process and, if we cannot
deliver, to step in. The message is really clear, and the response was
almost immediate, with a working group being formed.
Other key recommendations from the report that will impact building
services engineers include:
• A clear model of risk ownership, with clear responsibilities for the
client, designer, contractor and owner to demonstrate the delivery
and maintenance of safe buildings. The project team will be held
to account by the new JCA. This new body will have powers
during both construction and operation of a building, and for
existing buildings;
• A set of rigorous and demanding duty-holder roles and responsibilities to ensure a stronger focus on safety during a building’s
design, construction and refurbishment. These roles will be
broadly aligned with the Construction (Design and Management)
Regulations. Penalties for those “who choose to game the system
and place residents at risk”, as Dame Judith describes them, will
also be more serious.
• Moving towards a system where ownership of technical guidance
rests with the industry, with oversight by government. A clearer
package of regulations and “truly outcomes-based” guidance
which will be simpler to navigate while reﬂecting the level of
complexity of building work. It acknowledges that “prescriptive
regulation and guidance are not helpful in designing and building
complex buildings, especially in an environment where building
technology and practices continue to evolve, and will prevent
those undertaking the work from taking responsibility for their
actions”;
• A more effective product-testing regime with clearer labelling and
traceability because “the current process for testing and ‘certifying’ products for use in construction is disjointed, confusing,
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unhelpful, and lacks any sort of transparency”. Poor procurement
practices to be tackled to ensure high-safety, low-risk options are
prioritised and full life-cycle cost is considered when a building is
procured;
• A digital record from initial design intent through to construction, including any changes that occur during occupation, is also
called for, effectively producing a model similar to one created
under BIM Level 2. This digital model will create “a golden
thread of information” about each HRRB which is handed over
to the owner. The information can then be used to demonstrate to the regulator the safety of the building throughout its
life cycle;
• Clearer rights for residents are also proposed, as well as
responsibilities where resident activity can create risks that may
affect others.
Much of the report is eminently sensible and says a lot of things that
have needed saying for some time, although there is still a lot of
detail to be resolved.
It is not yet clear how the government will proceed to address the full
package of recommendations, but the Secretary of State for Housing,
Communities and Local Government has already set out what will
happen next:
• Government has consulted on restricting the use of desktop
studies as a means of assessing the ﬁre performance of external
cladding in lieu of an actual ﬁre test. The consultation sought
views on whether desktop studies should be used at all, and
whether or not they are appropriate for construction products,
wall systems, or for any other purpose;
• Government has consulted on clariﬁcations to Approved
Document B (Fire) over the summer and on banning the use of
combustible materials in cladding systems on high-rise buildings.
Legislation on this point is thought to be imminent at the time of
writing. A full technical review of Part B of the Regulations, and of
the Guidance, is also very likely.
The full Government response was promised for “late autumn 2018”
and so may have emerged by the time you are reading this paper.
In the meantime, Grenfell is not the only high-rise ﬁre to have
occurred. In Melbourne, Australia, the Lacrosse Building suffered a
signiﬁcant ﬁre to which aluminium composite panels contributed.
There were no casualties, and the sprinkler system helped to control
the spread of the ﬁre. There was also a multi-storey hotel ﬁre in
Ballymun, Dublin recently. Thankfully, again there were no serious
casualties but the building suffered signiﬁcant damage. Following a
full investigation, the State of Victoria has now introduced legislation
to limit the use of such material on buildings in the State. New South
Wales has also introduced new regulations. Queensland, which has
an unknown number of buildings with potentially-combustible
cladding, has introduced legislation requiring owners of high-rise
buildings to register them with the State Building Control Commission
by next March, and those that appear to be at risk of having
combustible cladding will then be investigated further. It is not just
England that has the problem with this cladding.
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Grenfell was an awful event, and has devastated many lives. There
does appear to be a resolve to change the way that we build and
manage high-rise residential buildings in the UK, but we are now
getting to the challenge of starting to deliver change, and not talking
about it. In the meantime, it is clear that the problems we have in
England are not unique, and those elsewhere are also taking a close
look at the way they regulate their buildings in the light of their own
experience, and also that at Grenfell.
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